

























Emerging market economies (EMEs) have experienced a noticeable decline in inflation since 
the mid-1990s.  Whether this stable price environment in EMEs is likely to endure and what 
kind of policies need to be followed to ensure price stability, however, still continue to be 
questions of considerable policy relevance.  To shed some light on these questions, this study 
aims at investigating the factors associated with the start of 24 inflation episodes in 15 EMEs 
between 1980 and 2001.  To this end, the paper employs pooled probit analysis to estimate the 
contribution of the key factors to inflation starts.  The empirical results suggest that an increase 
in the output gap, agricultural shocks, and expansionary fiscal policy raise the probability of 
inflation starts in EMEs.  On the other hand, the findings indicate that a more democratic 
environment and an increase in capital flows relative to GDP reduce the probability of inflation 
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  Emerging market economies (EMEs) have experienced a noticeable decline in 
inflation since the mid-1990s.  Average inflation in these countries have declined from 
triple-digit figures in the late 1980s to low single digit figures by the end of 2001 once a 
few outlier countries are excluded.  This marked decline in inflation in EMEs is 
attributed to a more favorable external environment and the implementation of more 
prudent macroeconomic policies arising mainly from public discontent with high 
inflation.
1  More specifically, evidence suggests that fiscal consolidation—a prerequisite 
for macroeconomic stability—was one of the key contributing factors to disinflation: 
fiscal deficits in EMEs were lowered by one-half from the levels that prevailed in the 
1970s and 1980s (IMF, 2001).  External developments also contributed to the decline in 
inflation through mainly two channels: (i) the fall in global inflation; and (ii) the decline 
in oil prices in the first half of the 1990s.  In addition to these factors, institutional 
reforms such as the enhancement of central bank independence, structural reforms in 
trade, product, and labor markets along with the improved access to global capital 
markets were among the forces behind the noticeable decline in inflation in EMEs.  
  In view of the adverse consequences of high inflation (Bruno and Easterly, 
1998, Ghosh and Phillips, 1998, and Khan and Senhadji, 2000), the observed decline of 
inflation in EMEs is clearly a positive development.  However, whether this salutary 
development of stable price environment in these countries is likely to be permanent 
and what kind of policies need to be pursued to maintain price stability still remain 
questions of considerable policy relevance.  The objective of this paper is to shed some 
light on these questions by investigating the factors associated with the start of 24 
inflation episodes in 15 EMEs between 1980 and 2001.  To this end, we rely on a cross-
                                                 
1 IMF (2001). 
  2country data set and employ pooled probit analysis to estimate the contribution of the 
key factors to inflation starts.
2 Some earlier research has examined the determinants of 
inflation in EMEs.
3  To the best of our knowledge, however, there has not been any 
empirical study investigating the contributing factors to inflation starts in the case of 
EMEs, which would enhance the ability of policy makers in these countries to pursue 
appropriate policy actions in a preemptive manner.  
  The empirical findings suggest that an increase in the output gap—above-trend 
real economic activity—agricultural shocks, and expansionary fiscal policy raise the 
probability of inflation starts in EMEs.  On the other hand, the results indicate that a 
more democratic environment and an increase in capital flows relative to GDP reduce 
the probability of inflation starts in these countries.            
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a 
brief overview of the literature on the determinants of inflation in EMEs.  Section 3 
discusses the definition of inflation episodes and inflation starts.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical framework and estimation results.  Section 5 highlights the salient features of 
inflation starts, in view of the empirical findings.  Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper 
by summarizing the policy implications. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
The nature of the mechanisms underlying the dynamics of inflation in EMEs has 
stimulated much discussion.  A quick glance at the literature points to two different 
                                                 
2  Our approach is very similar to a recent study by Boschen and Weise (2003), which focuses on the OECD 
countries.  This study includes the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.  The selection of the 
countries is dictated by data availability for the period under consideration.   
3 See, for instance Loungani and Swagel (2001) and Mohanty and Klau (2001) as well as the references therein. 
  3explanations.
4  According to the first view, inflation is largely influenced by non-
monetary factors, most notably frequent supply shocks, which render the prediction of 
inflation a difficult task.  Such shocks are likely to complicate the monetary 
transmission mechanisms by obscuring the role of demand side factors in the inflation 
process.  The second view puts forth that non-monetary factors affect only the short-run 
path of inflation, while, in the long run, monetary variables determine the inflation rate.  
As a result, it is argued that the standard output gap model should offer a reasonable 
explanation of the inflation dynamics in EMEs.  As was pointed out by Mohanty and 
Klau (2001), however, the reality for EMEs is likely to lie somewhere between the two 
competing explanations.  With this in mind, we will highlight the main tenets of the 
relevant literature in the context of EMEs below.    
The nexus between the fiscal deficits, monetary growth and inflation emerges as 
an important reason for sustained rates of high inflation.
5 In spite of the theoretical 
links, the empirical evidence concerning the link between fiscal deficits and inflation 
has been rather elusive.  At the level of any particular country, it may be difficult to 
establish a clear short-term link between fiscal deficits and inflation.  In fact, the 
correlation may be even negative during extended periods of time.  Evidence suggests 
that the existence of a positive correlation in the long run is also not a clear-cut 
phenomenon (Agenor and Montiel, 1999).  For instance, Fischer et al. (2002) find that 
the relationship between the fiscal deficit and inflation is only strong in high inflation 
countries—or during high inflation episodes—but they find no obvious relationship 
between fiscal deficits and inflation during low inflation episodes or for low inflation 
countries. 
                                                 
4 The objective of this section is not to offer a thorough review of the literature.  Instead, it intends to highlight the 
pertinent issues for the purpose of this investigation.  Mohanty and Klau (2001) and Loungani and Swagel (2001) 
provide a comprehensive review of the relevant literature. 
5 See, for instance, Dornbusch (1992) and Bruno (1993). 
  4A recent study by Catão and Terrones (2001), however, was successful in 
relating long-run inflation to the permanent component of the fiscal deficit scaled by the 
inflation tax base, measured as the ratio of narrow money to GDP.  Their findings 
suggest that a 1 percent reduction in the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GDP typically 
lowers inflation by 1.5 to 6 percentage points depending on the size of the money 
supply. 
On time consistency, central bank independence has received a great deal of 
attention in the literature.  It is argued that a lack of central bank independence can lead 
to succumbing to political considerations, thereby engendering a monetary policy looser 
than optimal.  For instance, if there is a perception that pursuing expansionary monetary 
policy can increase output, politicians could put pressure on the central bank—say 
during the election period—to trade off a boost to growth against higher inflation. In 
fact, the IMF (1996) found that inflation performance between 1975 and 1995 in 
industrial countries is negatively correlated with an index of central bank independence. 
However, the findings of this study also suggest that the same relationship did not hold 
over the same period for developing countries.  This conclusion may be attributed to 
imprecision in the measurement of central bank independence arising from a divergence 
between de jure and de facto central bank independence in these countries.
6 
  Indeed, a recent study by Gutierrez (2003) explores the relationship between 
inflation performance and the level of independence of the central bank entrenched in 
the constitution as opposed to the de jure independence established in the central bank 
law.  Her results suggest that Latin American countries that entrench the independence 
of the central bank in the constitution tend to have lower inflation, even after controlling 
                                                 
6  Independence is typically assessed by evaluating the central bank’s founding legislation and its institutional 
structure. 
  5for other factors.
7  Central bank independence, however, cannot, by itself, ensure the 
credibility of monetary policy, which hinges on the overall stance of macroeconomic 
policy.  For example, if the fiscal policy is deemed to be inconsistent with the inflation 
target, credibility is impossible to attain, even with an independent central bank. 
  Evidence suggests that the significance of the exchange rate in the evolution of 
domestic inflation tends to be greater in EMEs compared to advanced economies.
8  In 
these countries, the pass-through of a depreciation into domestic prices could be much 
larger than the share of imported goods in the consumption basket would indicate.  This 
is because an increase in the price of imports in the face of a depreciation would also 
affect inflation expectations.  An increase in inflation expectations, in turn, would tend 
to depreciate the exchange rate as agents buy foreign currency to maintain purchasing 
power.  In view of this feedback between the exchange rate and domestic prices, a 
country can easily fall victim to a vicious circle of depreciation and inflation.     
  Large supply shocks emerge as an important source of inflation in EMEs.  As 
was pointed out by Fischer (1981), supply shocks may have major macroeconomic 
implications for EMEs.  Notwithstanding the nature of the shock—i.e., temporary vs. 
permanent—the size of the overall price impact hinges on the importance of the sector 
in question for overall consumer inflation.  For instance, food and energy have a 
relatively larger share in the consumer price index (CPI) compared to advanced 
economies.  Consequently, a marked increase in prices of these commodities not only 
raise short-run inflation owing to their high weight in CPI, but also can engender a 
sustained increase in the inflation rate if it raises expectations.
9   
                                                 
7 Typically constitutions are better enforced than ordinary laws in view of their superior legal rank.  Furthermore, 
modifications generally required qualified majorities to make the constitution much harder to amend than a law. 
8 Ho and McCauley (2003). 
9 In this respect, it should be noted that if supply shocks are accommodated by monetary policy, they can lead to 
demand driven inflationary pressures. 
  6  Political determinants of inflation have also received considerable attention in 
the literature.  Political business cycle models developed by Nordhaus (1975) and 
Lindbeck (1976) envision that central banks pursue an expansionary monetary policy in 
the period leading up to an election in order to increase the governing party’s chances 
for reelection.  The empirical evidence on the political business cycle hypothesis is 
mixed.  McCallum (1978) and Alesina (1988) reject the hypothesis.  A recent study by 
Alesina and Roubini (1997) finds that while elections have no impact on output and 
unemployment, they do affect inflation. 
  There is very little empirical evidence on the implications of political regime-
type or other regime characteristics for inflation.
10  Concerning this issue, there appears 
to be two competing schools of thought: populist approaches and state-capture 
approaches.  According to the former, politicians responding to public demands increase 
government expenditures by resorting to inflationary finance.  The institutional 
characteristics of democracy—electoral competition, separation of powers, partisanship, 
and political fragmentation—in turn raise pressures on politicians to use inflation tax.   
In view of this conjecture, populist approaches assert that inflation is less likely if 
governments with consolidated, autonomous—even dictatorial—powers can avoid these 
pressures. State-capture approaches, on the other hand, contend that price instability is 
not a result of demand for inflationary financing by the public, but by incumbent 
politicians and their elite patrons, who receive private benefit from money creation.  
The proponents of this view argue that democratic accountability promotes price 
stability since the reliance on the inflation tax is eroded once elites encounter credible 
challenges to their authority. 
                                                 
10 See Desai et al. (2002) and references therein. 
  7  Two recent studies focusing on the determinants of inflation in EMEs are 
noteworthy to discuss briefly in this section.  A study by Lougani and Swagel (2001) 
employs vector autoregressions (VARs) to study the experience of 53 developing 
countries between 1964 and 1998.  They estimate VAR’s consisting of the following 
variables: (i) money growth and exchange rates; (ii) the output gap and a measure of the 
world business cycle; (iii) changes in the price of oil and non-oil commodities; (iv) past 
realizations of inflation.  Their findings suggest that either money growth or exchange 
rate movements—depending on the ordering—explain two-thirds of the variance of 
inflation at both short and long horizons.  Their results indicate that inflation 
expectations also play an important role in the inflation process in developing countries: 
past realizations of inflation explain between 10 and 20 percent of inflation movements.  
Overall, their findings suggest that cost shocks or the output gap are not significant 
factors affecting the evolution of inflation in these countries. 
  By contrast, Mohanty and Klau (2001), who study the experience of 14 
emerging market economies in the 1980s and 1990s, find that exogenous supply 
shocks—in particular those to food prices—play an important role in the inflation 
process.  Food prices typically account for a larger percentage of the CPI in emerging 
market economies than in industrial countries.  Furthermore, food prices tend to be very 
volatile owing to the influence of weather and the presence of trade restrictions.  Their 
results suggest that although demand factors, captured by the output gap and excess 
money, have significant impact on inflation, their unique importance cannot be 
established for all countries.  Wage growth and exchange rate changes, on the other 
hand, appear to make important contributions to inflation volatility in many countries.  
Their findings also indicate that inflation persistence plays an important role in 
explaining both the average level of inflation and its variation. 
  83. Definition of Inflation Episodes and Inflation Starts 
Prior to proceeding with the empirical investigation, it is important to clarify the 
definition of inflation episodes and starts.  To this end, we rely on Ball (1994) and 
Boschen and Weise (2003) and construct the trend inflation series by calculating the 
nine-quarter moving average of the quarterly consumer price inflation rate.  Next, we 
turn to the determination of trough and peak dates of inflation, which are identified as 
dates at which trend inflation is lower (higher) than in the preceding and succeeding 
four quarters.  An inflation episode is then defined as a period of time over which trend 
inflation rises by at least 1 percent from trough to peak and which is preceded by four or 
more quarters of stable or declining trend inflation.
11  In total, we capture 24 inflation 
episodes for which detailed information can be found in Appendix A (Figures 1 and 2).   
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Following Boschen and Weise (2003), we define the start date for an inflation 
episode as the year following the year in which the trough took place.  As can be seen 
from Figure 1, which depicts inflation starts, 17 out of the 24 inflation starts occurred 
                                                 
11 In the definition of an inflation episode, we require a 1 percent rise from trough to peak though Boschen and Weise (2003) 
employ a 2 percent threshold for the OECD countries. The rationale behind our choice of 1 percent rise is that emerging 
market economies included in this paper have experienced long lasting periods of high inflation and, as a result, a lower 
threshold—1 percent as opposed to 2 percent—seems to be more appropriate in capturing the periods of sustained increase 
in inflation. The fact that the average rise in inflation per quarter during inflation episodes in Boschen and Weise (2003) 
amounts to 0.36 percent, while the same figure in our case is 2.18 percent, supports this conjecture.  Nevertheless, the 
empirical results remain intact when we employ a 2 percent threshold in lieu of 1 percent. 
  9before 1990.  This indicates that roughly 3 out of every 4 episodes in our sample took 
place in the 1980s, the years of 1986 and 1987 witnessing the largest number of episode 
starts.    Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the 24 inflation episodes. Over the 
full sample, the average length of inflation episodes is roughly 15 quarters and 21 of 
them last for more than 8 quarters. Average rise in inflation, from trough to peak, is 
about 26 percent. In Table 1, we decompose our sample into three periods: 1984-1989, 
1990-1995, and 1996-2001.  The first period captures the period during which access to 
global capital markets was relatively limited.  For the 12 episodes ending this period, 
the average length and the rise in inflation are about 13 quarters and around 44 percent, 
respectively.   
Table1: Summary Statistics for Inflation Episodes 
   Episodes  Ending 
 Full  Sample 1984-1989  1990-1995  1996-2001 
Number of episodes  24  12  8  4 
Length (quarters)  14.83  13.33  18.13  12.75 
Initial inflation rate  9.82  10.99  9.62  6.71 
Ending inflation rate  35.85  54.61  19.87  11.56 
Rise in inflation  26.03  43.62  10.25  4.85 
Note: Figures are average values over the respective periods. Inflation figures come from our series 
obtained through nine-quarter centered moving average process.  
 
There are 8 episodes between 1990 and 1995 with an average length of 18 
quarters and an average rise in inflation of roughly 10 percent. It is interesting to note 
that during this period, which is characterized by increased access to capital markets, 
the average length of episodes are longer but the rise in inflation is substantially lower 
when compared to the 1984-1989 period.  For the 1996-2001 period, we have only four 
episodes.  Average length of episodes is around 13 quarters, similar to that of the 1984-
1989 period.  Average rise in inflation, on the other hand, is noticeably lower, around 5 
percent, compared to other periods.  In the next section, we will present the empirical 
framework and estimation results for 24 inflation starts in 15 EMEs between 1980 and 
2001. 
  10Figure 2: Inflation Episodes in 15 Emerging Market Economies (1980-2001) 
   


























1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000




























1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
























1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000




























1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
























1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
  114. Empirical Framework and Results 
  We employ probit analysis to investigate the factors associated with the start of 
the above highlighted inflation episodes in 15 emerging market economies between 
1980 and 2001.  In the estimations, the dependent variable is a binary variable, which 
takes on a value of 1 if an inflation start took place in that country during that year and a 
value of 0 otherwise.  We stack the data for each country and estimate the probit models 
using maximum likelihood.
12  The variables that we consider largely draw on the 
empirical specifications employed in previous studies.   
Table 2 presents the probit estimates for the models included in our study.  We 
report the marginal effect of the independent variables evaluated at the means of 
variables involved along with the z-statistic associated with the coefficient estimate.  
The first model that we consider, Model 1, includes output gap (GAP), the percentage 
change in food production index (FP) and the percentage change oil prices (OIL) with a 
view to study the importance of above-trend real activity and supply shocks for inflation 
starts in these countries.
13  The results point to a strong positive relationship between the 
output gap and inflation starts, lending support to the policy mistake hypothesis.
14  More 
specifically, the findings show that a 1 percent rise in GDP growth above trend 
increases the probability of an inflation start by 7.6 percent.  The results also suggest 
that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between FP and inflation 
starts—a finding underscoring the importance of agricultural shocks in inflation starts.  
On the other hand, there is no evidence that oil price shocks triggered inflation episodes 
                                                 
12 Appendix B provides a detailed description of the data. 
13 The results do not change when we consider the percentage change in oil prices in national currency instead of in 
U.S. dollars.  
14 The policy mistake hypothesis puts forth that policies aimed at expanding real economic activity above its potential 
are associated with inflation episodes (Sargent, 1999 and Taylor 1992). 
 
  12during the period under consideration.  Indeed, the coefficient associated with OIL is 
negative though not statistically significant.   
 
Table 2: Probit Estimations for Inflation Starts
a  
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
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Log  likelihood  -81.6 -79.2 -78.7 -77.7 -76.8 -75.12 
McFadden R
2  0.052 0.079 0.084 0.093 0.107  0.123 
Number of observations (0/1)  306/24  306/24  306/24  301/24
b 306/24  301/24
b 
a Absolute values of z-statistics, calculated using the Huber/White procedure, are given in parentheses 
under the corresponding coefficient estimates.  
b Five observations are missing since the DEMOC 
variable for South Africa (1992 and 1993), Korea (1987), Peru (2000), and for the Phillipines (1986) were 
indetermined.  
 
  Model 2 incorporates budget surplus as a percentage of GDP (BS) to assess the 
role of fiscal policy in inflation starts.
15  The results underline the important link 
between fiscal policy and inflation starts: a 1 percent rise in BS reduces the probability 
of an inflation start by 5 percent.  The output gap and FP continue to be statistically 
significant with their expected signs for inflation starts in this specification. 
                                                 
15 The lack of data for the majority of countries considered did not let us to examine the effect of the government 
debt on inflation starts.  
  13In Models 3 and 4, we attempt to assess the importance of political determinants 
for inflation starts.  To this end, we employ two variables, namely DEMOC and 
DURABLE for which Appendix B provides a detailed explanation.  The first variable is 
a measure for institutional democracy, while the second variable captures the durability 
of the regime in the countries involved.  The empirical results suggest that both 
DEMOC and DURABLE are negatively correlated with inflation starts, though only the 
former variable is marginally significant.  The contributions of BS, FP, and output gap 
to inflation starts still remain statistically significant with their expected signs in Models 
3 and 4. 
In view of the substantial increase in capital flows to EMEs particularly during 
the 1990s, we also consider the impact of capital flows in relation to GDP (CF) on 
inflation starts in Models 5 and 6. A priori, it is expected that this development should 
be beneficial for disinflation since an increase in CF would reduce the need for 
seigniorage.
16  The empirical results concerning Models 5 and 6 point that CF has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of inflation starts.   
Focusing on Model 6, the findings indicate that a 1 percent increase in CF reduces the 
probability of inflation start by 8.6 percent.  Consistent with the findings in other 
models, an increase in the output gap raises the probability of inflation starts, while a 
rise in food production and budget surplus reduce the probability of inflation starts.  
Moreover, the findings indicate that a higher democracy score reduces the 
probability of inflation starts: a 1 unit increase in the democracy score lowers the 
probability of an inflation start by 6.7 percent. The results seem to lend support to the 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that despite their obvious benefits—increased efficiency and a better allocation of capital, and 
associated transfer of technology—the inflows have generated concerns in view of their potential adverse impact on 
macroeconomic stability, the competitiveness of the export sector, and external viability.  Indeed, the inflows are 
viewed as a serious risk, which can fuel inflation and lead to an unsustainable real appreciation of the real exchange 
rate.  However, the link between the inflows and inflation is not straightforward; it is influenced by the recipient 
country’s economic objectives, exchange rate regime, institutional constraints, and, particularly, the causes and the 
composition of the inflows.  Consequently, this issue needs to be settled empirically. 
  14state-capture view, which argues that strong, insulated governments are needed to 
prevent inflation.
17  As was explained previously, this approach contends that inflation 
does not stem from voters or consumers pressuring politicians to ease monetary or fiscal 
constraints, but rather, because, incumbents obtain private benefits from money creation 
and from public spending (which they can then channel to favored constituents).
18  
Accordingly, the main challenge of price stability is to force accountability upon 
incumbents to limit their private accumulation of wealth. 
In addition to the specifications presented in Table 2, we have experimented 
with the inclusion of the lags of the variables involved and considered other models 
incorporating money growth, broad money in relation to GDP, change in the exchange 
rate, excess domestic credit growth, openness, current account balance in relation to 
GDP, and the ratio of broad money to international reserves as well as their lags.  These 
variables turned out to be statistically insignificant and, as a result, were not included.
19  
This finding, however, does not necessarily imply that these variables were not 
important in individual episodes; it simply suggests that they did not have systematic 
effects in our sample of inflation episodes. 
 
5. A Quick Glance at Inflation Starts 
In this section, we examine the contribution of the variables involved in 
triggering inflation starts. We derive the decomposition of these contributions, 
presented in Table 3, from Model 6 in which all of our key variables are statistically 
significant. The figures under the column labeled probability are the fitted values of 
probabilities of the inflation start and are defined as: 
                                                 
17 This finding is consistent with Cukierrman et al. (1992) who find that seignorage is larger in more totalitarian 
countries. 
18 See Geddes (1995) for more on this. 
19 The results of these experiments are available upon request. 
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the estimated coefficients from Model 6, and the index for the independent variables, 
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sample period. 
i
  We decompose the index, ∑
i
i jt i X β , , in order to observe the contribution of 
each individual variable to the start of inflation episodes. The percentage contribution of 
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Our approach to computing the contributions differs slightly from that of 
Boschen and Weise (2003) since we divide the contribution of each variable by the 
absolute value of the total contribution of variables considered to the index.  The use of 
the absolute value operator in the denominator of Equation (2) enables us to obtain the 
percentage contributions with correct signs since the total contribution to the index can 
take negative values.  
  The numerator of Equation (2) is the product of the coefficient estimate of 
variable  ,  i i β , and the deviation of   from the sample mean,  jt i X , ) , i jt i X X − ( . In other 
words, the individual contribution of each variable is determined by the coefficient 
estimate and the deviation of the actual value of the variable from the full sample mean 
at the year of the episode start. Percentage contribution of each variable to the index at 
  16each episode start is reported in Table 3, which presents the average probabilities and 
percentage contributions for the years of episodes. 
Although it is rather difficult to generalize the salient features of inflation starts 
across countries, several brief comments are in order concerning the results presented in 
Table 3.  In majority of the inflation starts—17 out of 24—the contribution of the output 
gap is positive, documenting the importance of the above-trend real activity in 
triggering inflation.  This, in turn, suggests that in the case of 17 episodes the output gap 
at the start dates was higher than the full sample mean of this variable. The percentage 
contribution of DEMOC carries a negative sign in 16 out of 24 inflation episode starts, 
suggesting that in these episodes this variable reduced the probability of an inflation 
start.  However, in the case of the remaining 8 episodes the DEMOC variable 
contributes positively to inflation starts since the democracy score is below the sample 
average. 
  In the case of the variable BS, the findings suggest that this variable lowered the 
probability of an inflation start only in the case of 12 episodes.  Since BS has a negative 
coefficient estimate in Model 6, this implies that the budget performance in the 
remaining 12 episodes was worse than the full sample average.  The results also indicate 
that the variable FP contributed positively to inflation starts in half of the episodes, 
while that of capital flows in relation to GDP appears to be positive in 21 episodes.  The 
latter result, in turn, implies that inflation starts are associated with CF lower than the 





  17Table 3: Relative Importance of Major Variables in Inflation Starts  
      Percent Due to
b 
Country  Probability
a  GAP FP DEMOC BS CF
A. EPISODES 
     
Argentina 1987 0.16  0.27 0.73 -0.19 -0.06 0.25
      
1986 0.49 0.32 0.16 -0.03 0.41  0.15 Brazil 
1992 0.02 -0.51 -0.32 -0.24 0.04  0.04
      
Colombia 1984 0.03  -0.04 -0.37 -0.53 0.24  -0.30
      
India 1990 0.12 0.00 0.25 -0.28 0.62  0.41
      
1986 0.09 -0.23 -0.54 1.31 -0.03  0.48 Indonesia 
1997 0.17 0.19 0.47 0.60 -0.27  0.01
      
Israel 1983 0.19 -0.07 -0.26 -0.24 1.99  -0.42
      
Korea 1986 0.16  0.36 -0.08 0.64 -0.35  0.43
      
Malaysia 1987 0.11  -0.27 -0.15 0.18 0.46  0.78
      
1985 0.19 0.09 -0.11 0.45 0.35  0.23 Mexico 
1990 0.07 1.74 -1.52 1.67 -0.39  -0.50
      
1980 0.10 0.02 0.63 -0.15 -0.19  0.68 Peru 
1987 0.16 1.15 -0.63 -0.08 0.28  0.29
      
1983 0.20 0.04 0.56 0.51 -0.12  0.01 Philippines 
1987 0.16 0.41 0.40 -0.19 -0.11  0.49
      
South Africa  1984 0.10  1.47 -0.74 -0.16 0.21  0.22
      
Thailand 1986 0.20  -0.31 0.65 0.26 0.06  0.34
      
1983 0.12 0.24 0.61 -0.12 -0.19  0.46
1987 0.17 0.61 0.33 -0.08 0.00  0.14
1990 0.06 5.45 -3.20 -2.54 -0.43  1.72
Turkey 
2001 0.15 -1.04 0.58 -0.20 1.36  0.29
      
1984 0.06 0.99 4.42 -2.34 -5.55  3.48 Venezuela 
1992 0.06 2.58 -0.45 -1.01 -0.21  0.09
B. AVERAGES 
 1980 0.10  0.02 0.63 -0.15 -0.19  0.68
 1983 0.17  0.07 0.30 0.05 0.56  0.02
 1984 0.06  0.81 1.11 -1.01 -1.70  1.13
 1985 0.19  0.09 -0.11 0.45 0.35  0.23
 1986 0.24  0.03 0.05 0.54 0.02  0.35
 1987 0.15  0.44 0.13 -0.07 0.11  0.39
 1990 0.08  2.39 -1.49 -0.38 -0.06  0.54
 1992 0.04  1.03 -0.39 -0.62 -0.09  0.06
 1997 0.17  0.19 0.47 0.60 -0.27  0.01
 2001 0.15  -1.04 0.58 -0.20 1.36  0.29
a Probability figures are the fitted values from Model 6. 
b Figures presented are the percentage differences between 






  186. Conclusions  
  Following the dramatic decline in inflation in emerging market economies 
(EMEs) since the mid-1990s, safeguarding the stable price environment has emerged as 
one of the most important policy priorities.  Existing studies have largely focused on the 
determinants of inflation in EMEs in lieu of the factors triggering the inflation episodes.  
With a view to enhance the ability of policy makers in EMEs to take appropriate actions 
in a preemptive manner, we investigate the factors associated with the start of 24 
inflation episodes in 15 EMEs between 1980 and 2001 by employing pooled probit 
analysis.  The empirical results show that an increase in GDP growth above trend, 
agricultural shocks, and expansionary fiscal policy raise the probability of inflation 
starts in EMEs.  The findings, on the other hand, indicate that a more democratic 
environment and an increase in capital flows relative to GDP reduce the probability of 
inflation starts in these countries.            
  Policy implications of this investigation can be summarized as follows.  First, 
our results document the importance of prudent fiscal policy in reducing the probability 
of inflation starts.  In spite of the widespread view that fiscal policy is closely connected 
with inflation in many EMEs, the empirical evidence pertaining to this link has been 
rather elusive.  In this respect, the findings provide the much-needed additional 
empirical support concerning the importance of fiscal discipline for maintaining price 
stability.  Second, earlier research has been inconclusive in establishing a close link 
between inflation and output gap in the context of EMEs.
20 Based on our findings, 
however, the link between economic activity above trend and inflation starts in EMEs 
appears to be quite robust, suggesting that central banks in EMEs should closely 
monitor the current and future path of aggregate demand in the economy.    
                                                 
20 See, for instance, IMF (1996) and Lougani and Swagel (2001). 
  19Third, the importance of agricultural shocks for inflation in EMEs has also been 
acknowledged in previous studies.
21 The fact that food accounts for a larger share of the 
consumption basket in EMEs and that food prices are subject to the vagaries of the 
weather complicates the conduct of monetary policy in these countries.
22  This is 
because the role of monetary policy is more lucid and its impact is more potent when 
inflation is mainly driven by demand shocks and when demand changes can be traced 
by indicators such as monetary growth or output gap.  By contrast, the strong impact of 
agricultural shocks on inflation engenders questions about the appropriate target for 
policy.  Moreover, in view of the relatively high weight of food in CPI in EMEs, 
agricultural shocks not only increase the short-run inflation, but also can generate a 
sustained increase in the inflation rate if it raises inflationary expectations.  As a 
consequence, EMEs should endeavor to liberalize agriculture to reduce the volatility of 
food prices and central banks in these countries should make an effort not to 
accommodate such shocks as their accommodation can lead to demand driven 
inflationary pressures.      
  Fourth, the negative association of inflation starts with capital inflows highlights 
the importance of creating a conducive environment in EMEs for ensuring a high 
quality of external financing.  In fact, the movement away from more stringent 
exchange rate arrangements towards inflation targeting or some form of this monetary 
policy in EMEs renders the quality of external financing an important policy issue. In 
this respect, recent studies offer the following insights: (i) countries with less stable 
external financing encounter difficulties in using the exchange rate to weather external 
                                                 
21 See, for instance, Debelle (2001) and Mohanty and Klau (2001). 
22 As noted by Debelle (2001), the share of food in the consumption basket is under 20 percent in Australia, while its 
share is around 50 and over 40 percent in the Philippines and Indonesia, respectively. 
  20shocks; and (ii) flexible exchange rate regimes are viable in financially open economies 
provided external financing is not based on very volatile capital.
23       
  Finally, the negative association of the democracy indicator employed in this 
study, which mainly reflects the competitiveness of political participation, the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive, 
with inflation starts implies that a more democratic environment promotes price 
stability.  This, in turn, underscores the significance of a more democratic environment 
for the preservation of price stability and efforts for greater democratization in EMEs. 
                                                 
23 See, for instance, Goldfajn and Olivares (2001). 
  21Appendix A: Inflation Episodes
a 
Table A1: Inflation Episodes
24,25 
Country  Trough Date  Trough Inflation (%) Peak Inflation (%)  Peak Date 
Argentina 1986:3  19.88  165.60  1989:2 
       
1985:4 27.61  131.34  1989:2  Brazil 
1991:3 63.01  123.53  1993:2 
       
Colombia 1983:4  4.02  6.88  1991:1 
       
India 1989:1  1.47  3.25  1991:2 
       
1985:3 1.11  2.18  1987:3  Indonesia 
1996:3 1.73  8.51  1998:1 
       
Israel 1982:1  21.45  45.68  1984:3 
       
Korea 1985:4 0.52  2.17  1991:1 
       
Malaysia 1986:4  0.10  1.18  1991:4 
       
1984:3 12.48  24.30  1987:1  Mexico 
1993:4 1.96  8.29  1996:1 
       
1979:4 12.73  24.93  1984:3  Peru 
1986:4 15.72  211.42  1989:3 
 
     
1982:2 1.66  7.56  1984:2  Philippines 
1986:2 0.27  3.82  1990:1 
       
South Africa  1983:1  2.85  4.21  1986:1 
       
Thailand 1985:1  0.27  1.53  1990:2 
       
1982:2 6.68  10.58  1984:4 
1986:3 7.88  14.52  1988:4 
1989:3 12.04  17.23  1996:4 
Turkey 
2000:1 11.12  12.21  2000:4 
        
1983:1 1.80  12.94  1989:3  Venezuela 
1991:4 7.28  16.61  1995:3 
 
a As was explained in Section 3, the inflation figures presented in the table are the filtered values of actual 
quarterly consumer price inflation using a nine-quarter centered moving average process. 
                                                 
24 There were inflation episodes in Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, 
and Thailand whose start date turned out to be before 1980 and, as a result, could not be included in the 
investigation.  The lightly shaded areas in Figure 2 present some of these episodes, which commenced 
before 1980 and ended in the early 1980s.   
25 We have also considered including Chile in our study.  However, the evolution of the inflation rate in 
this country displays a significantly different pattern since Chile has reduced its trend inflation noticeably 
during the late 1970s and the early 1980s compared to countries involved. On this ground, we have not 
included Chile in our analysis. 
  22Appendix B: Data Definition and Sources 
INFLATION ≡ CPI inflation rate obtained from source b (line 64). 
 
GAP ≡ Deviation of the real GDP growth from its trend, which is computed using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothness parameter of 100. Annual real GDP growth  
figures are taken from source a.  
 
FP ≡ Percentage change in the index of food production. Data on food production index 
is taken from source a. 
 
OIL ≡ Percentage change in dollar price of oil obtained from source d.  
 
DEMOC ≡ The democracy indicator. It is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The 
operational indicator of democracy is a weighted average of the scores of the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive, taken from source c.  
 
DURABLE ≡ Regime durability. The number of years since the most recent regime 
change. The first year during which a new regime is established is set as baseline year 
and DURABLE is assigned the value of zero for that year. Each subsequent year adds 
one to the value of the variable, taken from source c.  
 
BS ≡ Overall government balance expressed as percentage of gross domestic product, 
taken from source a. 
 
CF ≡ Ratio of net private capital flows to gross domestic product, taken from source a.
26   
 
The data set covering the period 1980-2001 was compiled from the following 
sources:
 27  
 
a.  World Development Indicators, The World Bank;  
b.  International Financial Statistics CD-ROM of the IMF, Version 1.1.54; 
c.  Polity IV Database;  
d.  Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED); 




                                                 
26 For Israel and South Africa the series are constructed by taking the ratio of the financial account—obtained from 
source b (line 78bjd)—to nominal GDP measured in USD, taken from source a. For South Africa, the financial 
account is proxied by the Net Errors and Omissions taken from source b (line 78cad) for the years 1980-1984. 
27 Without undermining the integrity of our data set,  we had to resort to source e for the missing data points for the 
BS variable in few cases.  
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